lem (p. 48), failing to mention a voluntary Christian mass departure, Jewish settlement, and Israeli expropriation of Arab houses.

The "guide," not disregarding its innovative presentation of biblical archaeology, is nonetheless rooted in a frame of reference, and discourse, which ultimately lead the reader to internalize very specific long-standing Zionist political and ideological premises, utterly negating the historical and social dimension of Palestinian existence. It is an interesting exercise in the political sociology of stones: its mechanics demonstrate how politics, religion, and science melt to become a sophisticated means through which political myths are established and orientalist perceptions sustained.

BACKGROUND TO A MASSACRE

The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right, by Ehud Sprinzak. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. xvii + 313 pages. Glossary to p. 318. Notes to p. 365. Bibliography to p. 378. Index to p. 392. $29.95 cloth.

Reviewed by **Andrea Barron**

When Dr. Baruch Goldstein from the West Bank settlement of Qiryat Arba pushed his way into Hebron's Haram al-Ibrahimi and gunned down twenty-nine Palestinian worshippers, most Israelis, including IDF Chief of Staff Ehud Barak, were shocked and surprised. There was no way to predict the 25 February massacre, Barak told the Shamgar Commission investigating the tragedy: "It was like a bolt from the blue."

One Israeli who probably was not surprised was Ehud Sprinzak, the Hebrew University professor who wrote this definitive study on the radical right in Israel. Sprinzak began the research for this book in 1984, a landmark year for the radical right. This was the year when police uncovered a Jewish terrorist network that planned to blow up the Dome of the Rock and five Arab buses, and the year when Rabbi Meir Kahane was elected to the Knesset on a platform calling for the expulsion of all Arabs from Israel and the occupied territories.

The evidence presented in Sprinzak's study shows that the massacre was anything but a "bolt from the blue"; Goldstein's hatred of Arabs had been shaped by the ideology of the radical right, which had penetrated deeply into Israeli society by the time he walked into the Hebron mosque, armed and ready to kill. Even Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had to admit that Goldstein was not just one lone lunatic—that support for him reflected what Rabin called "the danger of emerging Israeli racism, and to be more more precise, Jewish racism."

Sprinzak makes a clear distinction between the "moderate right," represented by the Likud bloc, and the "radical right," a "combination of ultranationalism, militarism, ethnocentrism, and religiosity" whose adherents divide the world "between the sons of light (themselves) and the sons of darkness (anyone who disagrees)" (pp. 20-21). The radical right includes extraparliamentary groups like Kahane's Kach party, banned after the Hebron massacre, and Gush Emunim ("Bloc of the Faithful"), the religious fundamentalists who led the drive to establish West Bank settlements after the 1967 war. Inside the Knesset, the radical right is represented by the Tehiya, Moledet, and Tsomet parties, all founded by ultranationalists after Menachem Begin committed the "treasonous" act of signing the Camp David Accords with Egypt.

Sprinzak traces the Zionist roots of the radical right in pre-1948 Palestine, the reemergence of the movement following the 1967 war, and its rapid growth between 1978 and 1984. It was Rabbi Avraham Kook, the first chief Ashkenazic rabbi of mandatory Palestine, who married Zionism and religious fundamentalism for the first time. He believed that Jews were living in a messianic age when Eretz Yisrael (the biblical Land of Israel, including the West Bank) was to be redeemed in its entirety. He opposed any partition of the land, because God had promised it to Abraham 5,000 years ago.

Rabbi Kook's son, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, carried on his father's work at the Yeshiva Merkaz Harav in Jerusalem and became the spiritual mentor of Gush Emunim. The Gush doctrine that Am Yisrael (the people of Israel) refers to the land as well as the people comes from the younger Rabbi Kook. This doctrine teaches that the people and the land cannot be separated, so it makes no sense to talk about giving up land to save lives, the argument of the Jewish religious peace movement.

If Gush Emunim only represented the views of its some 15,000 members, or even just the 130,000 settlers in the West Bank or Gaza, it would not be so influential. What

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has made it so successful, says Sprinzak, has been its ability to push the moderate right even further so that fully 20-25 percent of Israeli Jews now share its extremist ideology. This has brought about a long-term shift in Israeli political culture. A significant sector of the population now supports a form of "limited democracy" which would refuse to accept a decision made by a democratically elected Israeli government to give up any part of Eretz Yisrael.

How did Gush Emunim become so successful? Sprinzak explains that movement leaders were able to combine sophisticated lobbying and electoral strategies with extralegal political maneuvering, making it possible for them to "have their cake and eat it too." On the legal front, Gush Emunim lobbied administration officials and Knesset members to support an expanded settlement policy. And in 1982, Yuval Ne'eman, an esteemed scientist who became a Gush Emunim activist and leader of the Tehiya party, became minister of science and technology in a Likud-led government. Ne'eman also took responsibility for settlements, "moving every shekel he could get his hands on to Judea and Samaria" (p. 195).

At the same time, the bloc did not let the law stand in the way of its determination to settle the West Bank. For example, between 1974 and 1977, then-Prime Minister Rabin tried to prevent Gush activists from establishing a settlement at Elon Moreh, outside of Nablus. But the activists persisted. Seven times they tried to settle illegally and seven times the army forced them to leave. Finally, Rabin gave in and allowed them to remain in a military compound nearby. Breaking the law paid off when it came to settling the West Bank.

While only a small minority of Gush Emunim activists have endorsed the use of violence to achieve their goals, glorification of physical force has always been an integral part of the philosophy of Kach, the movement founded by Meir Kahane. For Kahane, "Kiddush Hashem" (the sanctification of God's name) meant revenge against non-Jews for the thousands of years of persecution—"a Jewish fist in the face of an astonished gentile world that that had not seen it for two millenia, this is Kiddush HaShem" (p. 219). Similar to the Islamic fundamentalist movement Hamas, which views Palestine as "an Islamic Waqf (Trust)" where non-Muslims must live "in the shadow of Islam," Kahanism says non-Jews can live in Eretz Yisrael but only as "alien residents" who are willing to accept a subordinate status in the state.

After Kahane immigrated to Israel in 1971, the first place he chose to distribute his anti-Arab hate literature was Hebron. The city had always been important to Kahane; it was King David's first capital, the site of the 1929 massacre of sixty-four Jews by local Arabs, and the location of the Cave of the Machpelah, where the Jewish patriarchs and their wives are supposed to be buried. Kach's only chapter outside Israel proper, according to Sprinzak, is located in nearby Qiryat Arba. Until he was assassinated in 1990, Kahane maintained almost absolute control over the movement he founded, with one exception—Qiryat Arba. Only there, says Sprinzak, did Kach activists organize activities on their own and manage to get themselves elected to the city council. It was this combustible combination of religious extremism and Kach activism, now part of the political culture of Hebron/Qiryat Arba, which produced Baruch Goldstein.

In the last chapter of this superb book, Sprinzak ponders the future of the radical right. If there is a major territorial compromise in the West Bank, possibly leading to "meaningful autonomy" or a Palestinian state, he does not rule out a civil war or major violent conflict, especially if territorial compromise is implemented by a Labor-led government (p. 312). Today's scenario does not bode well for a peaceful transition from Israeli to Palestinian rule. Not only did a Labor-led government agree to a major territorial compromise, but it negotiated this compromise with the PLO. Yes, Gush Emunim mentor Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook forbade his followers from engaging in any confrontation with the "holy" army of the "holy State of Israel." But he never imagined that the prime minister of this "holy state" would sign a peace agreement with Yasir Arafat.

The radical right may lose its fight for Eretz Yisrael, Sprinzak explains, but it is not likely to disappear. "It will continue to haunt the nation's collective psyche. Long after Judea and Samaria are gone, bitter people will remain who will dream about a possible 'second round,' the 'right of return,' and 'transfer.' The majority of Gush Emunim, which is likely to undergo a major theological crisis will probably urge patience, bow to the mysteries of redemption, and wait for the next Six-Day War—which will only prove that they were right all along" (p. 313). Sound familiar?