Palestinian Politics and the Middle East Peace Process: Consensus and Competition in the Palestinian Negotiating Team

 Eight years after the beginning of the second Palestinian uprising, it seems that the Oslo Accords of 1993 onwards have failed to achieve their objectives. The reasons behind this failure have always seized the attention of scholars, politicians, researchers and decision-makers. The book examines one of the salient aspects of the bilateral peace negotiations: the structure and performance of the Palestinian negotiating team that had a great impact on the outcome of the negotiations during the 1991-1997 period. It focuses on the interaction between the PLO leadership outside the occupied Palestinian areas and the leadership emerging from the Palestinian grassroots in the areas dominated by Israel. This interaction led to a conflict of interests when the time came to reach the final agreement. Since the author is a member of the Palestinian leadership, and he was present during the negotiating process in Madrid and Washington, the book contains original information that have not been published before, including information about the multilateral negotiations in Washington and important internal Palestinian meetings. It is therefore an excellent source to understand the Palestinians' performance during the peace negotiations, and the erosion of the peace efforts, with the resulting radicalization of attitudes and increasing tendency towards violence.